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REWRITING 11 U.S.C. § 523(A)(16): THE PROBLEMS OF
DELAYED FORECLOSURE AND JUDICIAL ACTIVISM
ABSTRACT

To protect the interests of homeowners’ associations and other housing
communities in situations where their member homeowners have declared
bankruptcy, § 523(a)(16) of the Bankruptcy Code excepts from discharge any
“fee or assessment” that becomes due after the order of relief, as long as the
debtor has a “legal, equitable, or possessory ownership interest” in the
property. This section was intended to unify through legislation a split of
authority deciding how to handle such postpetition fees.
Unfortunately, by electing to protect first and foremost the interests of
HOAs, Congress placed debtors in a position not conducive to the idea of a
fresh start by which bankruptcy law is ordinarily guided. The result is a group
of cases that are inconsistent with one another and with the Code, as some
courts have taken steps to attempt to ease the burden on the debtor, while
others have noted with resignation that, fair or not, the Code’s plain language
is clear and precludes judicial intervention. Further muddying the waters, the
problems with the Code are different depending on whether the debtor’s
discharge was affected under § 727, § 1328(a), or § 1328(b).
Given that the Code as written has failed to accomplish the unity sought in
curing the split of authority, Congress should revisit not only its language but
also the policy that informed the amendment. The nation’s economic realities
have changed since the 2005 amendment was passed, and these changes have
brought into sharp focus the problems with the exception as it currently
applies.
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I. INTRODUCTION
While a debtor’s bankruptcy has the potential to harm all creditors,
Congress has set out to protect a class of creditors that is particularly
vulnerable to economic turmoil caused by bankruptcy: homeowners’
associations, condominium management organizations, and housing
cooperatives (collectively, “HOAs”).1 In an effort to protect HOAs,
§ 523(a)(16) of the Bankruptcy Code (Code) made postpetition HOA dues
nondischargeable “for as long as the debtor or the trustee has a legal, equitable,
or possessory ownership interest” in the property that is burdened by HOA
fees.2 On its face, this provision seems obvious and logical, and many courts
ruled this way even before the initial version of the provision was enacted in
1994 to cure disagreement among various courts.3 These decisions were based
on the theory that “the debtor’s obligation to pay the assessments arose from
his continued postpetition ownership of the property and not from a prepetition
contractual obligation.”4 This makes sense on the most basic level; to continue
reaping the benefits of association membership, as a homeowner does while
she continues to own property in the neighborhood, a homeowner should be
expected to contribute to that association’s financial resources.
However, in practice, § 523(a)(16) creates two distinct problems. The first
is that ownership is not such a simple concept. Although debtors in this
situation can be essentially broken into two categories—vacating and nonvacating homeowners—the Code does not distinguish between the two groups.
As a result, courts sometimes take extraordinary steps to interpret the Code in a
way that allows vacating homeowners’ postpetition HOA fees to be discharged
while still requiring non-vacating homeowners to continue paying. This seems
only fair, but is not within the Code’s plain language.
The second problem is that, under a strict interpretation of the plain
language, this common-sense outcome is achieved only in chapter 7 non-

1

H. R. REP. NO. 109-31, at 88 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 154.
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(16) (2012).
3 See, e.g., River Place E. Hous. Corp. v. Rosenfeld (In re Rosenfeld), 23 F.3d 833 (4th Cir. 1994)
(holding that fees, dues, and assessments owed to community associations arose out of a covenant running
with the land that was effective as long as the debtor retained the property).
4 Alfred Q. Ricotta, Comment, Community Associations and Bankruptcy: Why Postpetition Assessments
Should Not Be Dischargeable, 15 BANKR. DEV. J. 187, 192 (1998).
2
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vacated-property cases and in some chapter 13 vacated-property cases.5 This is
because the exception provided for in § 523(a)(16), like most other § 523(a)
exceptions, does not apply in ordinary chapter 13 cases when discharge is
executed under § 1328(a).6 The result of this strict reading of the Code is that
in any chapter 7 case in which the debtor vacates a property on which the
creditor does not timely foreclose, the homeowner is left paying recurring fees
for a home she no longer occupies.7 The opposite problem is caused by the
inapplicability of the exception to § 1328(a), which can lead to either a nonvacating homeowner having her debts discharged or a vacating homeowner
being expected to pay, depending on the court’s statutory interpretation.
In the chapter 7 context especially, some courts have reacted by throwing
up their collective hands and yielding to the Code’s clear, but inequitable, plain
language. Others have been more creative in overcoming explicit
congressional actions even when they lead to either unfair liability imposed
upon debtors (in the case of chapter 7 and § 1328(b) vacating homeowners), or
a potential windfall in favor of debtors (in the case of § 1328(a) non-vacating
homeowners). By examining cases representing both scenarios, this Comment
will argue that it is necessary for Congress to once again revisit the language of
§ 523(a)(16) to align the outcomes demanded by the Code with the ideals of
fairness and reason outlined by those cases that expressed such disapproval of
the statutory outcomes. Fixing the legislation is crucial, for despite the
importance of protecting vacating debtors8 and preventing non-vacating
debtors from discharging their HOA fees,9 the only way courts can unilaterally

5 A small set of chapter 11 cases, where the debtor is an individual, is influenced by the statute in a
similar way. See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(2). It mirrors the application of the chapter 7 case, so the outcome of a
chapter 11, non-vacated case would also come out appropriately.
6 See id. § 523(a). By contrast, the exception does apply to discharge under § 1328(b). Id.
7 See generally Pigg v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P. (In re Pigg), 453 B.R. 728 (Bankr. M.D.
Tenn. 2011); Foster v. Double R Ranch Ass’n (In re Foster), 435 B.R. 650 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2010).
8 See, e.g., Allard v. G & P Enters. (In re Allard), No. 07-11487, 2012 WL 2830158, at *1 (Bankr. N.D.
Cal. July 10, 2012) (expressing sympathy with vacating debtor’s position, but concluding that it is to rule
according to the statute); In re Brown, No. 09-14949, 2011 WL 1322311, at *2 (Bankr. D.N.J. Apr. 6, 2011)
(holding that vacating debtor’s postpetition HOA fees were nondischargeable); Canning v. Beneficial Me., Inc.
(In re Canning), 442 B.R. 165, 172 (Bankr. D. Me. 2011) (stating that creditor did not violate a discharge
injunction by failing to foreclose upon the debtor’s property); In re Colon, 465 B.R. 657, 663 (Bankr. D. Utah
2011) (noting that holding vacating debtors liable for postpetition HOA fees is “not only inequitable, but in
contrast to the plain language of § 1328(a)”); Pigg, 453 B.R. at 731, 736 (holding that bank and HOA
consented to sale by their inaction when the debtor abandoned property in a chapter 7 case).
9 See generally Foster, 435 B.R. at 650 (holding that postpetition fees of non-vacating debtors are
nondischargeable when debtor obtained a discharge through § 1328(a)).
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meet these goals is by taking steps that risk usurping Congress’s traditional
rulemaking role.10
This Comment begins with a discussion of the discrepancy between how
the § 523(a)(16) exception would operate if applied according to its plain
language and how it has been typically applied in practice. Cases decided
under each of the discharge provisions illustrate the need for an additional
amendment to this portion of the Code. The Comment then concludes with a
discussion of the changes Congress could make to better balance the
competing interests involved in a bankruptcy case. In the end it depends on
which interests Congress most strongly favors. However, because the purpose
of this provision as written seems in conflict with the overall goals of
bankruptcy, a change of some kind needs to be made to clarify once and for all
the role of the HOA creditor in bankruptcy.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Statutory Provisions and Legislative History
Section 523(a) contains various exceptions to any “discharge under [§] 727,
1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b).”11 This Comment will focus on those
chapters that deal with bankruptcy proceedings initiated by individual debtors:
chapter 7 liquidation cases and chapter 13 payment plan cases. In particular,
this Comment considers the consequences of § 523(a)(16), which prevents the
discharge of any “assessment[s]” owed to an HOA if those assessments arise
postpetition.12 That section makes nondischargeable any debt:
for a fee or assessment that becomes due and payable after the order
for relief to a membership association with respect to the debtor’s
interest in a unit that has condominium ownership, in a share of a
cooperative corporation, or a lot in a homeowners association, for as
long as the debtor or the trustee has a legal, equitable, or possessory
10 See Allard, 2012 WL 2830158, at *1; Brown, 2011 WL 1322311, at *2; Canning, 442 B.R. at 172;
Colon, 465 B.R. at 662–63; Pigg, 453 B.R. at 733–35.
11 11 U.S.C. § 523(a). Chapter 12 cases, which are limited to family farmers and fishermen, are so
unique, specific, and rarely used, that they are not examined in this Comment. Id. § 109(f). Chapter 11 cases,
meanwhile, invoke this exception only in very limited circumstances because they deal primarily with
companies, which rarely owe debts to the types of living communities contemplated by the statute. On the rare
occasion that a chapter 11 case does deal with an individual debt, the process mirrors that of a chapter 7 case,
so that section will not receive its own analysis. See, e.g., In re Burgueno, 451 B.R. 1, 3 (Bankr. D. Ariz.
2011).
12 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(16).
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ownership interest in such unit, such corporation, or such lot, but
nothing in this paragraph shall except from discharge the debt of a
debtor for a membership association fee or assessment for a period
arising before entry of the order for relief in a pending or subsequent
13
bankruptcy case.

As introduced above, one notable problem with this exception in its present
form is Congress’s 2005 extension of the § 523(a)(16) exception to any “legal,
equitable, or possessory” interest in the real property on which assessments are
due.14 The second problem is Congress’s decision not to except from discharge
such debts under § 1328(a) as it does under § 1328(b).15
While strange, the decision not to apply the § 523(a)(16) exception to all
bankruptcy cases seems intentional given that the relevant portion of § 523(a)
has been amended once already, despite the fact that it had been effective for
less than twenty years.16 Passed in 1994, the section was enacted to “resolve
the split of authority . . . regarding the dischargeability of postpetition
assessments.”17 This split consisted of three main lines of authority:18 (1) under
the first, postpetition assessments were not dischargeable because they arose
from a covenant that ran with ownership of the land;19 (2) under the second,
they were dischargeable as part of a prepetition contract;20 and (3) under the
third, courts favored a compromising position that made debts dischargeable
“unless the debtor resided in or leased the unit.”21 Some courts have concluded
that Congress elected to enact this third line of reasoning in the 1994 Act,22 but
in fact the amendment created a new question.
Rather than focusing, as the preceding cases had done, on the nature of the
agreement from which the obligation arose—that is, in the form of either a
covenant running with the land or as a prepetition contract—Congress decided
13

Id.
Id.
15 Id. Section 1328(b) is a rarely used provision that allows a hardship discharge if “the debtor’s failure to
complete . . . payments [under the plan] is due to circumstances for which the debtor should not justly be held
accountable.” Id. § 1328(b).
16 See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 412,
119 Stat. 23, 107 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(16)); Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-394, § 309, 108 Stat. 4106, 4137 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(16) (1996)).
17 Ricotta, supra note 4, at 190; see 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(16) (1996).
18 Ricotta, supra note 4, at 191.
19 Id. (citing River Place E. Hous. Corp. v. Rosenfeld (In re Rosenfeld), 23 F.3d 833 (4th Cir. 1994)).
20 Id. (citing In re Rosteck, 899 F.2d 694 (7th Cir. 1990)).
21 Id. (citing In re Ryan, 100 B.R. 411 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989)).
22 In re Whitten, 192 B.R. 10, 13 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1996); see Ricotta, supra note 4, at 194.
14
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to except from discharge all postpetition debts when discharge was brought
under certain specified Code provisions.23
In 2005, the statute was amended again.24 Congress passed the amendments
under the influence of private interest groups25 “to broaden the protections
accorded to community associations with respect to fees or assessments arising
from the debtor’s interest in” such communities.26 To achieve this end,
Congress expanded the provision’s exception, precluding discharge of
postpetition assessments for property when the owner retains the much broader
“legal, equitable, or possessory” interest, rather than limiting discharge only to
properties possessed by or earning rent for the debtor.27 Indeed, the legislative
history indicates an express intent to expand preexisting limits to discharge
“[i]rrespective of whether or not the debtor physically occupies such
property.”28
One other statutory provision of importance to this analysis is 11 U.S.C.
§ 105(a),29 which provides courts with the equitable powers that some have
used to overcome inequities caused by the statute’s current formulation. That
provision states:
The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary
or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title. No provision of
this title providing for the raising of an issue by a party in interest
shall be construed to preclude the court from, sua sponte, taking any
action or making any determination necessary or appropriate to
enforce or implement court orders or rules, or to prevent an abuse of
30
process.

In interpreting this section of the Code, various courts have expressed the idea
that “[w]hatever equitable powers remain in the bankruptcy courts must and
can only be exercised within the [Code’s confines].”31 Courts may therefore

23

See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(16) (2012).
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 412, 119
Stat. 23, 107 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(16)).
25 Pigg v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP (In re Pigg), 453 B.R. 728, 733 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2011).
The Pigg court used this terminology derisively, possibly as a way of justifying its encroachment on legislative
power.
26 H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, at 88 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 154.
27 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(16).
28 H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, at 88.
29 See generally 11 U.S.C. § 105(a).
30 Id.
31 Nw. Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988).
24
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exceed their expressed powers only to carry out the Code’s provisions;32 these
powers “do not amount to a ‘roving commission to do equity.’”33 In other
words, “when a specific Code section addresses an issue, a court may not
employ its equitable powers to achieve a result not contemplated by the
Code.”34 This Comment will argue that, in several instances, courts have taken
liberties in enforcing the Code that exceed the equitable powers properly
exercised under § 105.
B. Applying § 523(a)(16)
To best understand the implications and interpretations of § 523(a)(16), it is
helpful to examine the practical problems caused by the Code as it exists
today. There are four sections through which an individual debtor may obtain
discharge of his debts: §§ 727, 1328(a), 1328(b), and (rarely) 1141(d)(2).35
Within each of these, a debtor may either seek to retain his property or to
surrender it to his creditors. The table below provides an overview of each of
these scenarios, comparing the intuitive outcome—where a vacating
homeowner’s debt is discharged, while a non-vacating homeowner’s is not—
with what actually results from a precise textualist application. A “√” in the
actual result column indicates a match between the expected and actual
outcome, while an “X” shows the opposite.

32 Pigg v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P. (In re Pigg), 453 B.R. 728, 735 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2011)
(citing Childress v. Middleton Arms, L.P. (In re Middleton Arms, L.P.), 934 F.2d 723, 724 (6th Cir. 1991)).
33 Pac. Shores Dev., L.L.C. v. At Home Corp. (In re At Home Corp.), 392 F.3d 1064, 1070 (9th Cir.
2004) (quoting Saxman v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Saxman), 325 F.3d 1168, 1175 (9th Cir. 2003)
(quoting United States v. Sutton, 786 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir. 1986))).
34 In re Fesco Plastics Corp., 996 F.2d 152, 154 (7th Cir. 1993).
35 As noted above, in a case involving an individual chapter 11 debtor, this exception has been applied in
keeping with the chapter 7 rule described in the table. In re Burgueno, 451 B.R. 1, 3 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2011)
(citing In re Brown, No. 09-14949, 2011 WL 1322311 (Bankr. D.N.J. April 6, 2011)) (equating the
circumstances with those in a chapter 7 case). Because of the parallel application under these two sections, this
Comment will examine only the chapter 7 and chapter 13 situations.
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Does § 523(a)(16)
apply?
§ 727 Intuitive
Result
§ 727 Actual
Result
§ 1328(a)
Intuitive Result
§ 1328(a)
Actual Result
§ 1328(b)
Intuitive Result
§1328(b)
Actual Result

Property Retained
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No discharge

Property
Surrendered
Discharge

No discharge – √

No discharge – X

No discharge

Discharge

Discharge – X

Discharge – √

No discharge

Discharge

No discharge – √

No discharge – X

Yes

No

Yes

1. Chapter 7
Chapter 7 is the liquidation chapter of the Code.36 Under this chapter,
subject to various exceptions that need not be examined in detail here, a
debtor’s assets are sold to pay creditors from the proceeds.37 Discharge under
this chapter is governed by § 727, which relieves the debtor of all liability for
any debts not otherwise declared nondischargeable by an applicable section of
the Code.38 Section 523(a) is one of these applicable exception sections,39 so
§ 523(a)(16) acts to expressly except from discharge any “fee or assessment”
to an HOA that arises after the filing of the petition.40
There seems to be little disagreement that this is a fair outcome as long as
the homeowner intends to remain on the property.41 By contrast, the exception
has frequently been challenged when the homeowner surrendered the property
as part of the bankruptcy proceeding, only to discover that a creditor was
unwilling to initiate foreclosure proceedings. Since such proceedings would
divest the homeowner of the ownership that triggers the § 523(a)(16)

36
37
38
39
40
41

2010).

See 11 U.S.C. § 726 (2012).
Id.
Id. § 727; see, e.g., id. § 523(a)(1)–(18).
Id. § 523(a).
Id. § 523(a)(16).
See, e.g., Foster v. Double R Ranch Ass’n (In re Foster), 435 B.R. 650, 659 & n.10 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
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exception, the ongoing debt becomes nondischargeable.42 Nevertheless,
looking only at the Code and the legislative history, it seems clear that the
“legal, equitable, or possessory” interest language from the 2005 amendment
was an express expansion of the 1994 version intended by Congress to apply
regardless of nature the homeowner’s relationship to the property.43 Therefore,
whether the outcome was intentional or unforeseen, it is squarely within the
plain language.
2. Chapter 13
In contrast to a chapter 7 discharge, under chapter 13, a debtor obtains
discharge through a payment plan approved by the courts.44 While chapter 7
discharge is governed by only a single section, chapter 13 bankruptcy cases
have two subsections of § 1328 that provide for the discharge of non-excepted
debts.45 Section 1328(a) provides for the typical chapter 13 discharge in which,
upon completion of the plan, the debtor is discharged of liability for any other
debts that arose prior to the bankruptcy petition.46 Even when a debtor has not
completed payment as required by the plan to make himself eligible for
§ 1328(a) discharge, the § 1328(b) “hardship discharge” applies in limited
circumstances to discharge the debtor’s remaining outstanding debts.47
Discharge under § 1328(b) is “rare”48 but broad, and is permitted under the
following circumstances: when the debtor fails to make payments as a result of
“circumstances for which the debtor should not justly be held accountable”;
when creditors have already received an amount “not less than the amount that
would have been paid” in the event of a full chapter 7 liquidation; and when
modification of the plan is not practicable.49 Section 523(a)(16) applies as
usual to chapter 13 cases when discharge is affected by § 1328(b).50
Unfortunately, just as in chapter 7 cases, a debtor in such a case may remain
indefinitely liable for recurring HOA dues if the debtor cannot divest itself of

42 E.g., Pigg v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P. (In re Pigg), 453 B.R. 728, 732 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn.
2011); Arsenault v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (In re Arsenault), 456 B.R. 627, 630 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2011).
43 H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, at 88 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 154.
44 11 U.S.C. § 1321.
45 See id. § 1328.
46 Id. § 1328(a).
47 Id. § 1328(b); In re Edwards, 207 B.R. 728, 729 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1997).
48 In re Heflin, No. 09-18642, 2010 WL 1417776, at *1 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Apr. 1, 2010).
49 11 U.S.C. § 1328(b).
50 Id. § 523(a).
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the property.51 Therefore, § 523(a)(16) exhibits the same shortcomings in
concert with § 1328(b) as it does with § 727.
Unfortunately, the effects of § 1328(a)’s omission from § 523(a) are not
clarified in the Code, and the courts’ varied reactions speak to the confusion
that persists as courts continue to try to balance the language of the statute with
the overarching goals of bankruptcy.52 Despite Congress’s efforts in both 1994
and 2005 to resolve the confusion surrounding postpetition HOA fees, the split
of authority shows that this has not yet been accomplished.
III. PROOF OF CLAIM
The § 523(a)(16) exception to discharge presents distinct problems for
courts depending on whether the bankruptcy was brought under chapter 7 or
chapter 13. The operation of the statute in each chapter will be addressed in
turn. The Comment will conclude by suggesting changes to the statute to help
restore the proper balance between protecting the interests of all parties
involved in the bankruptcy case while ensuring that fairness and consistency
are achieved across all chapters of the Code.
A. The Chapter 7 Problem
The application of § 523(a)(16) to chapter 7 cases where the debtor has
surrendered real property encumbered by HOA fees yet not foreclosed upon
poses the first problem.53 The current provision does not distinguish between a
homeowner who continues to live on the property and a homeowner who
retains only a legal ownership interest while awaiting foreclosure.54 Since the
2008 housing market crash, an increasing number of debtor-homeowners are at
risk of nondischargeable liability for HOA dues despite no longer living on the

51 It does not appear that any such case has come before a court, but there is no reason to believe that the
operation of the statute would be different from the corresponding chapter 7 circumstance.
52 Compare In re Colon, 465 B.R. 657, 662–63 (Bankr. D. Utah 2011) (stating that Congress’s intent
“should not be inferred from the omissions or anything other than the plain meaning of the statute”), and
Foster v. Double R Ranch Ass’n (In re Foster), 435 B.R. 650 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2010) (concluding that
§ 523(a)(16) is inapplicable to the discharge under § 1328(a)), with Maple Forest Condo. Ass’n v. Spencer (In
re Spencer), 457 B.R. 601 (E.D. Mich. 2011) (determining dischargeability of postpetition HOA fees not by a
§ 523(a) analysis, but by looking at the timing of the debts).
53 See, e.g., Pigg v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P. (In re Pigg), 453 B.R. 728 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn.
2011); In re Brown, No. 09-14949, 2011 WL 1322311, at *3 (Bankr. D.N.J. Apr. 6, 2011).
54 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(16).
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property or enjoying the benefits of membership.55 Most troublingly, this
liability could theoretically continue “in perpetuity.”56
This conflict between the plain language of the Code and the overarching
goals of bankruptcy has caused a split in the courts.57 Most express disapproval
and concern over this unjust outcome but find no authority on which to base a
decision that might take steps to solve the inequity.58 While this is no comfort
to a debtor saddled with an indefinite burden, such a decision does at least
adhere to the Code. But at least one court has simply ignored the statutory
language in favor of an equitable remedy, a resolution that had already been
rejected by prior decisions, and which has since been criticized as
impermissible judicial activism.59
Most courts have determined that judicial intervention is simply not the
proper course of action, regardless of any apparently unfair outcome, because
the statutory language is so clear.60 Noting that a court “is required to rule
according to the statute and not its sympathy,” one court held that “[w]hile [it
did] not find the statute ambiguous, if it did it would find, based on the
legislative history, that Congress intended that postpetition homeowners’ fees
are forever nondischargeble [sic] irrespective of whether the debtor physically
occupies the property.”61 Another recognized that “[t]he legislative history of
the 2005 amendment makes it clear that Congress intended to broaden the
scope of protection for condominium associations under § 523(a)(16).”62 The
court continued: “While the [c]ourt is sympathetic to [the debtor’s]

55 See Arsenault v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (In re Arsenault), 456 B.R. 627, 630 (Bankr. S.D. Ga.
2011); Pigg, 453 B.R. at 734–35.
56 Pigg, 453 B.R. at 733.
57 Compare id. (fashioning an equitable remedy to aid the debtor), with In re Fristoe, No. 10-32887, 2012
WL 4483891, at *4 (Bankr. D. Utah Sept. 27, 2012) (refusing to grant relief “in direct contravention” of the
Code), and Brown, 2011 WL 1322311, at *2–3 (denying an equitable remedy).
58 See, e.g., Fristoe, 2012 WL 4483891 (stating that granting such relief is “beyond the scope of the
[c]ourt’s equitable powers under § 105(a)); Brown, 2011 WL 1322311, at *2–3 (expressing sympathy for
debtor’s situation but enforcing the statute as written).
59 See, e.g., Allard v. G & P Enters., L.L.C. (In re Allard), No. 11-1313, 2012 WL 2830158, at *1
(Bankr. N.D. Cal. July 10, 2012); Pigg, 453 B.R. at 735–36.
60 See, e.g., Fristoe, 2012 WL 4483891 (“The language of §§ 362 and 363 are clear, and in this case,
granting the relief requested by the [d]ebtors would be in direct contravention of the Bankruptcy Code”);
Allard, 2012 WL 2830158, at *1 n.2 (noting that the debtor essentially requested that the 1994 amendment be
applied, and stating “That is not the proper role of the court.”); Brown, 2011 WL 1322311, at *2–3 (“While the
Court is sympathetic to [the debtor’s] circumstances, it has no alternative but to interpret and enforce the
statute as written by Congress.”).
61 Allard, 2012 WL 2830158, at *1–2.
62 Brown, 2011 WL 1322311, at *2.
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circumstances, it has no alternative but to interpret and enforce the statute as
written by Congress.”63 A third court acknowledged that the creditor’s inaction
[does] not make things easy for the [debtors]. Forces remained at
work that could make their continued ownership of the real estate
uncomfortable . . . . But those forces are incidents of
ownership . . . . And although the Code provides a discharge of
personal liability for debt, it does not discharge the ongoing burdens
64
of owning property.

The fact that numerous courts have expressed concern that an incurable
inequity is done through a plain-meaning application of the Code’s provisions
might on its own be persuasive evidence that another amendment is necessary.
Judicial intervention is undeniably a faster option, but congressional action is
the only permissible avenue for rulemaking, if indeed no means of solving the
problem is available within the express interpretive power of the courts. One
court has nevertheless attempted to solve the problem despite the absence of
any congressional intervention. In Pigg v. BAC Home Loans Servicing (In re
Pigg), the court circumvented the plain meaning of the Code in an effort to
arrive at a fair result.65 This case is a striking example of the tension between
arriving at a fair result and the result warranted by the plain meaning of the
Code.66
In Pigg, the debtor vacated her home as part of her bankruptcy filing.67 The
property had been badly damaged in a flood, and the debtor expressed her
intent to surrender the property to the secured creditor holding the claim.68 An
agent of the bank changed the locks and placed a notice in the front window of
the home, prohibiting entry, but when the bank took no further action, the
debtor asked the court to force the bank to accept the deed to the property or to
foreclose so as to “cut[] off any further accumulating liability for HOA fees.”69
The court recognized that it “[was] not able to discharge what Congress [had]
legislated to be nondischargeable,” but for the sake of equity, it fashioned a
unique remedy whereby it forced a sale of the property and distributed the
proceeds to the creditors.70 It rationalized this action by finding “that the
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70

Id.
Canning v. Beneficial Me., Inc. (In re Canning), 442 B.R. 165, 172 (Bankr. D. Me. 2011).
Pigg v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P. (In re Pigg), 453 B.R. 728 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2011).
Id. at 735–36.
Id. at 731.
Id. at 730–31.
Id. at 731–32.
Id. at 735.
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[b]ank and the HOA [had] consented to the sale by their inaction,” allowing
the court to formulate a remedy to “balance[] the rights of the lienholders and
the right of a debtor to a fresh start.”71
The court in Pigg justified its creative and unusual steps by arguing that
changed circumstances have since made Congress’s 2005 amendments
insufficient to protect all interests in a bankruptcy case.72 There is no question
that the changes have occasionally led to various situations that have left the
debtor in a “predicament”73 or “quagmire”74 that amounted to less than
bankruptcy’s promised “fresh start.”75 These situations, according to the Pigg
opinion, “could not have [been] foreseen” prior to the “financial crisis that
crashed Wall Street, sunk the real estate market, and affected, to some degree,
almost every American. With the real estate collapse, lenders, who otherwise
have the right to do so, are choosing not to foreclose on their collateral[,]
leaving homeowners in limbo.”76 As one commentator noted, “[A] protracted
foreclosure process may actually keep a debtor from realizing the full benefit
of a fresh start in bankruptcy.”77 The court in Pigg simply rejected that the
legislative intent, however clear it may have been, would have been to put a
debtor in such a position.78
In spite of its declaration that the change in the economic climate should
materially influence the way the expressed legislative intent is to be viewed,
the court struggled to identify any convincing authority that would provide it
with the power to push back against this change in external circumstances. The
court settled on the equitable power granted by § 105(a), even while other
courts, in cases decided both before and after Pigg, rejected the same
reasoning.79

71

Id. at 736.
Id. at 733–34.
73 Allard v. G & P Enters., L.L.C. (In re Allard), No. 11-1313, 2012 WL 2830158, at *1 (Bankr. N.D.
Cal. July 10, 2012).
74 In re Colon, 465 B.R. 657, 663 (Bankr. D. Utah 2011).
75 In re Brown, No. 09-14949, 2011 WL 1322311, at *2–3 (Bankr. D.N.J. Apr. 6, 2011); Canning v.
Beneficial Me., Inc. (In re Canning), 442 B.R. 165, 172 (Bankr. D. Me. 2011); Pigg, 453 B.R. at 733, 735.
76 Pigg, 453 B.R. at 733.
77 Ariane Holtschlag, Assessing § 523(a)(16), AM. BANKR. INST. J., June 2012, at 16.
78 Pigg, 453 B.R. at 733–34.
79 In re Fristoe, No. 10-32887, 2012 WL 4483891, at *4 (Bankr. D. Utah Sept. 27, 2012) (stating that
granting such relief is “beyond the scope of the [c]ourt’s equitable powers under § 105(a)); Brown, 2011 WL
1322311, at *2–3 (expressing sympathy for debtor’s situation but enforcing the statute as written); see also 11
U.S.C. § 105(a) (2012).
72
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Section 105(a) provides the bankruptcy court with broad, but not unlimited,
discretionary power.80 Two portions of this provision are especially relevant.
First, a court is permitted to take any action necessary “to carry out the
provisions of this title.”81 Second, the last sentence seems to contemplate
primarily procedural inequities—enforcement of court orders or rules and
abuse of process—rather than substantive ones.82 The court in Pigg seemed to
convince itself over the course of the opinion that it had the authority to make
this decision, but in doing so undermined its own argument. In introducing
§ 105(a), the court acknowledged that the provision granting courts this
“power is constrained by the provisions of the [] Code.”83 Yet the court used
the power purportedly given by this section to ignore a substantive provision,
which it called a “legislated wrong without a remedy.”84
While it may be a well-known maxim that “equity will never suffer a
wrong without a remedy,”85 there are some problems with its application here.
First, regardless of the powers a court has in equity, it nevertheless “must rule
in accordance with the [] Code.”86 All other courts facing this issue have
acknowledged this explicitly.87 A court is simply not empowered to ignore
clear statutory language.88 Second, the statement89 referred to an ancient90
80 See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (“The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or
appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.”) (emphasis added).
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Pigg, 453 B.R. at 735 (citing Childress v. Middleton Arms, L.P. (In re Middleton Arms, L.P.), 934
F.2d 723, 724 (6th Cir. 1991)); see also 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (noting that equity extends only as far as necessary
“to carry out the provisions of this title”).
84 See Pigg, 453 B.R. at 735.
85 Id. (alterations in original) (quoting May v. Carlton, 245 S.W.3d 340, 356 (Tenn. 2008) (Koch, J.,
dissenting)).
86 In re Fristoe, No. 10-32887, 2012 WL 4483891, at *4 (Bankr. D. Utah Sept. 27, 2012) (citing Tuttle v.
United States (In re Tuttle), 291 F.3d 1238, 1245 (10th Cir. 2002)).
87 Allard v. G & P Enters., L.L.C. (In re Allard), No. 11-1313, 2012 WL 2830158, at *1 (Bankr. N.D.
Cal. July 10, 2012); Fristoe, 2012 WL 4483891, at *4; In re Brown, No. 09-14949, 2011 WL 1322311, at *3
(Bankr. D.N.J. Apr. 6, 2011); Canning v. Beneficial Me., Inc. (In re Canning), 442 B.R. 165, 172 (Bankr. D.
Me. 2011); see In re Heck, No. 09-31512, 2011 WL 133015, at *1–2 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2011).
88 See United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) (“[W]here . . . the statute’s
language is plain, ‘the sole function of the court is to enforce it according to its terms.’” (quoting Caminetti v.
United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917)). See also Tuttle v. United States (In re Tuttle), 291 F.3d 1238, 1245
(10th Cir. 2002) (“While . . . equitable arguments are compelling, they cannot overcome the plain language of
the Code.”).
89 In fact, the quoted assertion that “equity will never suffer a wrong without a remedy” does not even
appear in the case cited. May v. Carlton, 245 S.W.3d 340, 355 (Tenn. 2008). The statement to which it likely
referred came from Justice Koch’s dissent, and it is that quotation which I argue undermines Pigg’s claim that
it possesses the necessary authority to decide in this way. Compare Pigg, 453 B.R. at 735 (citations omitted)
(stating that “equity will never suffer a wrong without a remedy”), with May, 245 S.W.3d at 355 (referring to
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Tennessee Supreme Court case that allowed a court to exercise its discretion to
overcome inequity “if by law there is any means provided by which it can be
set aside and avoided.”91 Furthermore, that case dealt with an apparent inequity
in a death penalty case; 92 as life-altering as bankruptcy can be, clearly death
penalty cases might justify more judicial activism in certain situations. As the
courts in similar cases have found, there is simply no “means provided by
which it can be . . . avoided” while remaining within the Code’s contemplated
limits.93 Even according to the original court’s support, then, the equitable
powers claimed do not extend as far as Pigg took them.
In modern cases on point, courts have refused to interpret the duty of a
court of equity so loosely as to ignore a statute to the extent done in Pigg.
Judicial power can extend only so far even in the face of the types of inequity
that caused the court in Pigg to overreact and overreach.94 The approach
adopted in Pigg has been criticized, directly and indirectly, as overstepping the
judicial role.95 Clearly this is counter to congressional intent. A few courts
have gone so far as to note that debtors seeking relief similar to that given by
the court in Pigg are effectively requesting an application of the pre-2005
statute.96 At least one has directly questioned Pigg’s justification under
§ 105(a), noting that the Tenth Circuit has “reasoned that ‘[t]o allow the
bankruptcy court, through principles of equity, to grant any more or less than
what the clear language of [a statute] mandates would be tantamount to judicial
legislation and is something that should be left to Congress, not the courts.’”97

the “ancient maxim that there should be no wrong without a remedy” (citing Bob v. State, 10 Tenn. 173, 176
(1826))).
90 May, 245 S.W.3d at 355 (Koch, J., dissenting).
91 Bob, 10 Tenn.at 176.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 In re Fristoe, No. 10-32887, 2012 WL 4483891, at *4 (Bankr. D. Utah Sept. 27, 2012).
95 Moore v. BAC Home Loan Servicing, L.P. (In re Moore), 477 B.R. 918, 920–21 (Bankr. S.D. Ga.
2012).
96 Allard v. G & P Enters., L.L.C. (In re Allard), No. 11-1313, 2012 WL 2830158, at *1 (Bankr. N.D.
Cal. July 10, 2012) (noting that the debtor is essentially requesting that the 1994 amendment be applied, and
concluding, “That is not the proper role of the court.”); Fristoe, 2012 WL 4483891, at *4 (“Under the preBAPCPA statutory scheme, the [d]ebtors’ obligations to pay the HOA fees would be dischargeable as the
[d]ebtors do not reside, rent, or even have access to the [p]roperties.”).
97 Fristoe, 2012 WL 4483891, at *3 (alterations in original) (quoting Scrivner v. Mashburn (In re
Scrivner), 535 F.3d 1258, 1263 (10th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted)).
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In Pigg, the court attempted to argue that the ends justified the means, even
though other courts have explicitly avoided its methods.98 Simply put, the court
was undisciplined in its pursuit of equity, and encroached on the realm of
congressional lawmaking.99 This creative effort to overcome legislative
shortcomings achieved its goals only through impermissible means. Therefore,
if an alternative unexplored by a court does not exist, then a solution is
available only through congressional action.
Perhaps a more acceptable alternative would have been for the court to
focus primarily on the fact that the creditor in the case had actually taken
control of the property, a factual scenario absent in the vast majority of
comparable cases. The court in Pigg could have concluded that seizing the
property gave it “interest” in the property within the meaning of the Code.100
This alternative would have narrowed the degree to which Pigg adjusted the
plain language to reach its desired outcome. That way, rather than disregarding
the statutory provision altogether, the court would have at least had an
argument that its decision remained within the realm of statutory interpretation
as a determination of the meaning of “interest in the property.”101
In fact, two cases have mentioned similar arguments in deciding chapter 13
cases.102 In the first, Arsenault v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (In re
Arsenault), the court used this characteristic to distinguish Pigg and explain
why it was unwilling to force a sale of a property in a chapter 13 case.103 In the
second, In re Colon, the court used a narrowed definition of ownership
“interest” in construing what was necessary to trigger a continued obligation

98 Allard, 2012 WL 2830158, at *1 (noting that the debtor is essentially requesting that the 1994
amendment be applied, and stating “That is not the proper role of the court.”); In re Brown, No. 09-14949,
2011 WL 1322311, at *3 (Bankr. D.N.J. Apr. 6, 2011) (“While the court is sympathetic to [the debtor’s]
circumstances, it has no alternative but to interpret and enforce the statute as written by Congress.”).
99 Fristoe, 2012 WL 4483891, at *3 (Bankr. D. Utah Sept. 27, 2012) (quoting Scrivner, 535 F.3d at
1263).
100 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(16) (2012).
101 Id.
102 Arsenault v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (In re Arsenault), 456 B.R. 627 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2011)
(specifying that in Pigg, the only case cited as standing in opposition to the conclusion in Arsenault, the bank
had “actively taken possession of the property,” while under the facts before that court “[t]here [were] no
allegations that [creditor] ha[d] taken possession of the [p]roperty.”); In re Colon, 465 B.R. 657, 663 (Bankr.
D. Utah 2011).
103 Arsenault, 456 B.R. at 627 (stating that HOA fees are “incidents of ownership” and that the Code does
not “discharge the ongoing burdens of owning property” (quoting Canning v. Beneficial Me., Inc. (In re
Canning), 442 B.R. 165, 172 (Bankr. D. Me. 2011))).
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arising from a covenant running with the land.104 Colon distinguished the
owners’ rights and obligations to a home they had abandoned from the rights to
a home in which they continued to live.105 The court noted that, after
surrendering the property in bankruptcy, “the [d]ebtors ha[d] no consequential
interest in the [p]roperty that measure[d] up to rights to exercise ownership
interests and control,” “[d]espite the fact that the [d]ebtors [were] listed on the
title to the property.”106
Arsenault did not examine Pigg in detail, but merely offered it as one
counterexample containing a material difference in facts.107 Still, the lack of an
express disapproval of Pigg suggests that a more narrow focus might have
been a less egregious encroachment into the legislative realm. That said, the
problem with applying a chapter 13 interpretation, like Colon’s, to a chapter 7
case like Pigg, is that § 523(a)(16) does not apply to the majority of chapter 13
cases in the first place. As such, the court in Colon was free to interpret what
type of interest was sufficient to trigger liability, while Pigg should have been
bound by the terms provided in the Code.108 No matter the court’s argument in
Pigg, such a reading would still likely be in opposition to the plain meaning of
the statute; if being “listed on the title to the property” is not a “legal” interest
under § 523(a)(16),109 it is difficult to imagine what would meet that standard.
Still, at least such an argument would have left the court in its normal place as
an interpreter of statutory language,110 although this interpretation would still
likely have been unreasonable.
Overall the fact that even this narrow variance from the clear path laid out
by Congress would most likely fail to solve the problem, despite remaining
within the rightful bounds of judicial authority, only further suggests that the
exception as presently defined does too little to distinguish among the varying
degrees of ownership and the differing interests of homeowners and creditors.
If Pigg were indeed sufficient to overcome the inequities caused by the
statutory language, then perhaps Congress could go on without revisiting
104 Colon, 465 B.R. at 663. Although Colon was a § 1328(a) case, it used its understanding of the terms
“legal, equitable, or possessory” in a way that could nevertheless be applied to a chapter 7 case. See id. For a
discussion on how Colon distinguished its holding from that of Foster, see infra notes 174–80.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Arsenault, 456 B.R. at 630.
108 See Colon, 465 B.R. at 663.
109 Id.
110 In re Brown, No. 09-14949, 2011 WL 1322311, at *3 (Bankr. D.N.J. Apr. 6, 2011) (holding that the
court “ has no alternative but to interpret and enforce the statute as written by Congress”).
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§ 523(a)(16). Unfortunately, the actions taken by the court in Pigg overstepped
the boundaries of judicial power.111 Therefore, Congress must adjust the Code
to prevent the injustice Pigg attempted to eliminate.
B. The Chapter 13 Problem
Unlike the chapter 7 cases discussed above, where the Code gave a clear
instruction that was simply out of line with a basic understanding of fairness,
when dealing with postpetition HOA dues under chapter 13, the problem is
really one of consistency in statutory interpretation. Courts have largely been
able to plausibly interpret the statutory language so as to discharge postpetition
assessments when fairness seems to require it,112 while at the same time
avoiding a windfall for the debtor who remains in possession of the home after
bankruptcy.113 The problem arises out of the fact that to reach these intuitively
fair conclusions, courts have applied arguments that directly contradict one
another.114 This outcome is disfavored because, in general, “uniformity is an
important concern in federal statutory interpretation.”115 In short, courts have
exploited the statute’s ambiguities opportunistically, forming opinions that
seem on their own to be reasonable interpretations, while in fact there is no
single principle guiding the various opinions.116
While a split may be unproblematic in some areas of law, uncertainty as to
the obligations and risks associated with real estate investments may change
lender behavior. Overreaching court opinions may return HOAs to the preamendment position of lacking any continuing sources of income with which
to fund ongoing service to those homeowners who have not abandoned their
111

Pigg v. BAC Home Loans Servicing (In re Pigg), 453 B.R. 728, 733 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2011).
See Colon, 465 B.R. at 663 (noting that debtors were not enjoying benefits of the HOA and the
property itself when they surrendered the property and leaving them liable for the HOA fees would be
inequitable). But see Maple Forest Condo. Ass’n v. Spencer (In re Spencer), 457 B.R. 601, 614–15 (E.D.
Mich. 2011) (stating that “in the absence of any attempt by [d]ebtor to effect transfer ownership of the property
by tendering a deed in lieu of foreclosure or otherwise,” there is no reason to force the secured creditor to take
title to the property).
113 Foster v. Double R Ranch Ass’n (In re Foster), 435 B.R. 650 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2010) (doubting that the
“omission of § 1328(a) in § 523(a)(16) or vice versa evinces a legislative intent to discharge postpetition HOA
dues under § 1328(a)” when the debtor is not vacating property).
114 Compare Colon, 465 B.R. at 663 (stating that it did not need address the issue of whether the
covenants ran with the land under the state law), with Foster, 435 B.R. at 650 (stating that § 523(a)(16) is
inapplicable to discharge under § 1328(a) and vice versa and determining dischargeability of HOA fees
through analysis of whether covenant to pay HOA dues ran with the land).
115 Minasyan v. Gonzales, 401 F.3d 1069, 1076 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Kahn v. INS, 36 F.3d 1412, 1414
(9th Cir. 1994)).
116 Supra note 114.
112
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properties or defaulted on their debts; this would undo the broader protection
that Congress explicitly intended.117 This is particularly troublesome
considering the express intention of Congress in passing the 2005
amendment.118 The existence of the amendment is proof that the concern was
substantial enough to warrant congressional intervention, and courts cannot be
allowed to undo this.119
A peculiarity in the execution of discharge under § 1328(a) provides the
opportunity for the type of judicial rulemaking that has caused all this
confusion. In contrast to the chapter 7 problem, which stems from a
congressional addition to § 523(a)(16), the chapter 13 problem emerged as a
result of something Congress did not include: a provision applying the
§ 523(a)(16) exception to discharges effected under § 1328(a).120 Instead,
§ 1328(a) discharge purports to free the debtor of liability for any debt not
excepted by other various § 523(a) provisions or a handful of additional § 1328
exceptions, which do not include § 523(a)(16).121
Many courts facing this situation have favored a purposivist reading of the
Code to avoid a situation that would enable a chapter 13 debtor to retain
ownership of real property while discharging all future assessments incidental
to that ownership.122 Judges have therefore turned to various alternative
doctrines in an effort to avoid such a windfall for a debtor.123 These purposivist
cases have “decline[d] to infer that by not expressly connecting these unrelated
sections, Congress intended to broaden the § 1328(a) discharge to include
assessments that are excluded from other types of bankruptcy discharges.”124
The reasoning favored by such cases focuses on the stated legislative intent
in adding § 523(a)(16), which was to resolve a split of authority as to whether
association fees were dischargeable if they came due after a chapter 7 petition

117

H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, at 88 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 154.
See id.
119 See id.
120 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(16) (2012) (failing to include § 1328(a) to the discharge exception).
121 See id. §§ 523(a); 1328(a).
122 See, e.g., Foster v. Double R Ranch Ass’n (In re Foster), 435 B.R. 650, 659 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2010)
(“Our challenge is to harmonize the policy behind the discharge exception in § 523(a)(16) of protecting
homeowner’s associations with the policy under [c]hapter 13 that supports home ownership.”).
123 See, e.g., Maple Forest Condo. Ass’n v. Spencer (In re Spencer), 457 B.R. 601, 611–13 (E.D. Mich.
2011); Foster, 435 B.R. at 659.
124 Heffner v. Elmore, Throop & Young, P.C., No. 11-3369, 2012 WL 2138097 (D. Md. June 12, 2012)
(citing Foster, 435 B.R. at 659).
118
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was filed.125 Furthermore, “Congress stated that the provision was intended ‘to
broaden the protections accorded to community associations with respect to
fees or assessments arising from the debtor’s interest’” in a property governed
by such an association.126 Having thus determined that the omission of
§ 523(a)(16) from the list of applicable exceptions to § 1328(a) discharge was
not instructive, these courts then set out to determine how best to forge a rule
unencumbered by Congressional input.
Perhaps the most prominent of these purposivist § 1328(a) cases is Foster
v. Double R Ranch Association (In re Foster).127 In Foster, the debtor
attempted to retain possession of a property after bankruptcy while at the same
time arguing that his HOA fees were dischargeable as part of his chapter 13
plan.128 The debtor made two arguments: “(1) the discharge exception under
§ 523(a)(16) governing postpetition HOA dues is inapplicable to § 1328(a);
and, (2) the postpetition HOA dues arose out of a prepetition contract with the
Association and are thus prepetition debts which are dischargeable under the
holding of In re Rosteck.”129 The court agreed with the first contention, finding
the exceptions inapplicable,130 but rejected the argument that this was
indicative of congressional intent to permit discharge of such debts.131 The
court reasoned:
We recognize that the discharge provision under chapter 13 is
broader than that in chapter 7. However, we doubt the omission of
§ 1328(a) in § 523(a)(16) or vice versa evinces a legislative intent to
discharge postpetition HOA dues under § 1328(a) when the debtor
uses the cure and maintenance provisions under chapter 13 to stay in
132
his or her property after the order for relief.

This purposivist reading was bolstered by the view that the “challenge is to
harmonize the policy behind the discharge exception in § 523(a)(16) of
protecting homeowners’ associations with the policy under [c]hapter 13 that
supports homeownership.”133 The question, therefore, rested on “whether the

125 Liberty Cmty. Mgmt., Inc. v. Hall (In re Hall), 454 B.R. 230 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2011) (citing 4
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 523.24 (Alan N. Resnick and Henry J. Sommer, eds., 2010)).
126 Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 109-31, at 88 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 154).
127 Foster, 435 B.R. at 650.
128 Id. at 653–54.
129 Id. (citing In re Rosteck, 899 F.2d 694 (7th Cir. 1990)).
130 Id. at 657–58.
131 Id. at 659.
132 Id.
133 Id.
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condominium declaration and corresponding documents are simply a contract
or constitute a covenant running with the land.”134 This, according to Foster,
was a question of state law.135
Thus, the court instead adopted the reasoning of the case that chiefly
opposed In re Rosteck136 prior to the implementation of § 523(a)(16): In re
Rosenfeld.137 Under that decision, the duty to pay HOA fees and the like arose
out of a covenant running with the land, rather than from a prepetition
contractual obligation.138 According to Foster, this rule applied under
Washington law because the agreement requiring dues to be paid to the HOA
“[was] not a contract, but ‘a document that unilaterally create[d] a type of real
property.’”139 In other words, “as a matter of law, debtor’s personal liability for
HOA dues continue[d] postpetition as long as he maintain[ed] his legal,
equitable or possessory interest in the property and [was] unaffected by his
discharge,” making the payments nondischargeable under § 1328(a).140 The
rule was summarized as follows: “[Y]ou stay, you pay.”141
While Foster was limited to ensuring homeowners were not able to retain
their property and discharge the debts that continued to accrue during the
ownership, another court went even further in its purposivist interpretation of
§ 1328(a).142 Maple Forest Condominium Ass’n v. Spencer (In re Spencer) is
another case involving discharge under § 1328(a), but here the debtor vacated
his condominium around the time of his bankruptcy filing.143 The court
described the primary issue as “ultimately depend[ing] upon whether the
[postpetition] assessments of condominium fees constitute dischargeable
[prepetition] debts or nondischargeable [postpetition] debts.”144 Even though
134

Affeldt v. Westbrooke Condo. Ass’n (In re Affeldt), 60 F.3d 1292, 1296 (8th Cir. 1995).
Foster, 435 B.R. at 659–60 (When “there is no statutory default rule regarding an exception to
discharge for postpetition HOA dues,” the substance of what constitutes a claim is left to state law); see also
Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54–55 (1979) (declining to decide a case because “[p]roperty interests
are created and defined by state law,” and “Congress has generally left the determination of property rights in
the assets of a bankrupt’s estate to state law.”).
136 In fact, these two cases were the main decisions that exemplified the split of authority prompting
Congress to step in and add § 523(a)(16). Ricotta, supra note 4, at 191–94.
137 Foster, 435 B.R. at 660.
138 River Place E. Hous. Corp. v. Rosenfeld (In re Rosenfeld), 23 F.3d 833, 837 (4th Cir. 1994).
139 Foster, 435 B.R. at 659–60 (quoting Bellevue Pac. Ctr. Condo. Owners Ass’n v. Bellevue Pac. Tower
Condo. Ass’n, 124 Wash. App. 178, 188 (Ct. App. 2004)).
140 Id. at 661.
141 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
142 See Maple Forest Condo. Ass’n v. Spencer (In re Spencer), 457 B.R. 601 (E.D. Mich. 2011).
143 Id. at 604.
144 Id. at 605.
135
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“the language [of the Code] has been read to require the broadest available
definition of claim[,] . . . [i]t does not follow, however, that the definition of
claim is unbounded. To the contrary, there is no claim without a right to
payment, however uncertain.”145
Like the court in Foster, the court in Spencer began its discussion with an
examination of state law to determine whether contract or property rights
governed the original obligation to pay.146 This analysis, as in Foster, followed
a rejection of the view that § 523(a)(16) implied a statutory definition of claim
that expanded as far as postpetition assessments, making them dischargeable in
the absence of an exception.147 The court found the debt to have arisen out of
property law rather than contract.148 However, it also noted that “the obligation
to pay the assessed fees depends upon whether [d]ebtor remained the owner of
the property at all relevant times.”149 These obligations included the necessity
“to pay periodic assessments by the [HOA] arising from a covenant running
with the land.”150Although the debtor’s declared intent was to surrender the
property, the court reasoned that ownership of real property must be
transferred by a written document, and that verbal intent to surrender property
does no more than “establish that [d]ebtor will not oppose the transfer of
collateral.”151 The court held that the chapter 13 debtor was held liable for
postpetition HOA fees despite vacating the property,152 a reading that took the
running covenant line of authority even further than Foster.
Foster and Spencer focused on Congress’s intent to effectively reach a
conclusion consistent with what would have been the outcome had
§ 523(a)(16) been applicable to a § 1328(a) discharge. A plain language
approach would yield a different result. This is because in the Foster and
Spencer decisions, the courts ignored well-regarded canons of statutory
construction. The plain language of the Code suggests that all debts not
excepted from discharge are, virtually by definition, dischargeable.153 This

145

Id. at 605–06.
Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979)) (“Although the [] Code determines the extent of
claims and discharge of debts, the determination of property rights and enforceable obligations is left to state
law.”); Spencer, 457 B.R. at 609 (citing Raleigh v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15, 20 (2000)).
147 Spencer, 457 B.R. at 608.
148 Id. at 611.
149 Id. at 611–12.
150 Id. at 612–13.
151 Id. at 612.
152 Id. at 615–16.
153 11 U.S.C. §§ 727(a), 1328(a) (2012).
146
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understanding of the Code gives far more importance to the fact that
§ 523(a)(16) explicitly does not apply in cases where discharge is governed by
§ 1328(a).154 This intuition is reflected in the semantic canon of statutory
construction, expressio unius, which prescribes that “when a statutory
provision explicitly expresses or includes particular things, other things are
implicitly excluded.”155 In this context, the canon applies on two different
levels. First, by omitting § 1328(a) from the list of sections to which all of the
§ 523(a) exceptions apply,156 Congress implicitly expressed an intention to
allow discharge of postpetition assessments when discharge is governed by
§ 1328(a). Second, by specifically applying other § 523(a) exceptions to
§ 1328(a) discharge,157 Congress again implied that this was a conscious
decision made with regard to one specific exception and one specific class of
discharge.
Textualist courts have applied an analysis that an HOA obligation can only
be dischargeable if it is recognized as a claim under the Code.158 Various
courts have responded to the question with the initial observation that the
“Code broadly defines a claim,”159 and that “the United States Supreme Court
has recognized that Congress intended . . . to adopt the broadest available
definition of claim.”160 Some courts note that “the Code ‘contemplates that all
legal obligations of the debtor[, no matter how remote or contingent,] will be
able to be dealt with in the bankruptcy case.’”161
In keeping with this rule, a recent case noted “that postpetition HOA
assessments are claims under the Code, despite the fact that at the time of the
plan’s confirmation they are not yet ‘fixed’ or ‘matured’ and remain
‘contingent.’”162 Having concluded that the assessments in question could be
154

Foster v. Double R Ranch Ass’n (In re Foster), 435 B.R. 650, 658 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2010).
JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND REGULATION 224 (Robert D. Clark
et al. eds., 12th ed. 2010).
156 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (lacking inclusion of § 1328(a) in its discharge exceptions).
157 Id. § 1328(a) (excepting debts “of the kind specified” in § 523(a)(1)(B)–(C), (2)–(5), (8), (9)).
158 See, e.g., In re Hawk, 314 B.R. 312, 315 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2004) (“[T]he court must determine if the
[postpetition] condominium assessments are a claim that arose before the commencement of the case.”).
159 In re Kelly, No. 09-42376, 2010 WL 1740739, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2010) (citing In re Rosteck,
899 F.2d 694, 696 (7th Cir. 1990)).
160 Hawk, 314 B.R. at 315 (quoting Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 83 (1991) (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
161 In re Mattera, 203 B.R. 565, 571 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1997) (alteration in original) (quoting Pa. Dep’t of
Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 558 (1977) (citations omitted)).
162 In re Colon, 465 B.R. 657, 663 (Bankr. D. Utah 2011) (quoting In re Turner, 101 B.R. 751, 754
(Bankr. D. Utah 1989)). Although Turner was a pre-1994 amendment, chapter 7 case, the court in Colon
determined that while “[t]he congressional amendments to § 523(a)(16) did supersede Turner’s contention that
155

ADAMS GALLEYSPROOFS2

370

EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL

8/7/2014 12:03 PM

[Vol. 30

rightly defined as claims arising out of a prepetition contractual arrangement
under the Code, these courts have held that all such debts can be discharged
under chapter 13 in accordance with § 1328(a), in the absence of a provision to
the contrary.163 Other courts disagree with this analysis and find that the debtor
is provided a windfall with such reasoning.164 Still, at least one court was
willing, at least implicitly, to accept this reading of the Code when necessary to
avoid the same injustice avoided by the equitable remedy constructed in
Pigg.165
That case, In re Colon, came to a conclusion that is compatible with the
catchphrase portion of the Foster decision, but at odds with the Spencer
decision: in Colon the debtors did not “stay,” and the court determined their
postpetition debts to be dischargeable.166 Like in Foster, the Colon court found
that unless specifically identified, the § 523(a) exceptions, including
§ 523(a)(16), do not apply to § 1328(a) cases.167 The court in Colon diverged
by finding the dues dischargeable because they were claims provided for under
the chapter 13 plan.168 Unless excepted, claims provided for by the plan are
dischargeable,169 and the plain language of § 523(a) did not apply the
exceptions to the type of case before the court in Colon.170 After finding
§ 523(a)(16) inapplicable, the court chose not to proceed to the primary
question examined in Foster: whether the HOA fees were incidental to a
running covenant under the governing state law.171 Instead, the court skipped
this step altogether:

in a chapter 7 case, HOA postpetition assessments are [nondischargeable] under § 727 . . . the Amendments
did not disturb Turner’s contention that HOA postpetition assessments are ‘claims’ under the Code and thus
subject to discharge. Id.
163 Id.; Turner, 101 B.R. at 754.
164 Foster v. Double R Ranch Ass’n (In re Foster), 435 B.R. 650, 659 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2010) (rejecting
argument that § 523(a)(16) establishes generally that postpetition HOA dues are claims or debts that can be
discharged).
165 See Colon, 465 B.R. at 663 (rendering vacating debtor’s postpetition HOA fees dischargeable); Pigg v.
BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P. (In re Pigg), 453 B.R. 728, 734–35 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2011).
166 Colon, 465 B.R. at 662–63.
167 Id. at 662.
168 Id. Although part of the Turner holding was superseded by the 1994 and 2005 amendments to the
Code, in that it was a § 727 case which found postpetition assessments dischargeable as the “‘periodic
maturing of . . . prepetition claim[s],’” the court opinion noted that the court’s finding that HOA postpetition
assessments were claims under the Code was undisturbed. Id. at 661 (quoting Turner, 101 B.R. at 754).
169 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (2012) (“[T]he court shall grant the debtor a discharge of all debts provided for by
the plan or disallowed under [§] 502 of this title, except any debt” falling under various enumerated exception
provisions, including a group of listed § 523(a) subsections, of which § 523(a)(16) is not one.).
170 Id. § 523(a).
171 Colon, 465 B.R. at 663.
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The [c]ourt [did] not address the issue of whether [covenants] run
with the land under Utah state law. Despite the fact that the [d]ebtors
are listed on the title to the property, the [c]ourt finds that the
[d]ebtors have no consequential interest in the [p]roperty that
measures up to rights to exercise ownership interests and control.
Because the [c]ourt finds that postpetition HOA assessments are
dischargeable under § 1328(a), [the creditor] cannot pursue the
[d]ebtors for collection of those assessments and the stay should not
172
be modified to allow the same.

Thus, although it purported to distinguish itself from Foster, Colon in fact took
a position incompatible with that case. In Foster, the court made it clear that
the decisive question was whether the obligation to pay arose from a running
covenant or a contract, as the former would remain postpetition while the latter
would have become an obligation prior to the filing of the bankruptcy
petition.173 Instead of reaching this question, though, Colon implicitly accepted
the inapplicability of § 523(a)(16) to its own facts under § 1328(a) as evidence
that the assessments were a claim.174 This meant that the only question was
when that claim arose.175 Thus, the court assumed the claim was substantive in
nature without reaching an examination of state law and based its opinion
instead on the question of “when a debt or claim arises” for purposes of
determining discharge—a question governed by federal law.176
Notably, this court “share[d] the concerns voiced by the court in Pigg” that
a homeowner no longer holding any interest of benefit to him could be left to
shoulder the burden of assessments attached to an abandoned home.177 Colon
therefore rendered the HOA debts to be dischargeable in accordance to the
plan on the theory that the obligation arose out of a prepetition contract.178 This
ruling, the court said, prevents a conclusion that is “in contrast to the plain
language of § 1328(a).”179 Thus, the court found the HOA could not “pursue

172

Id.
Foster v. Double R Ranch Ass’n (In re Foster), 435 B.R. 650, 659 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2010).
174 See Colon, 465 B.R. at 662–63.
175 Id. at 663.
176 Id. (quoting In re Turner, 101 B.R. 751 (Bankr. D. Utah 1989)).
177 Id. at 661 n.20.
178 Id. at 661–62. Although Colon never referred to prepetition contracts, its discussion adopted Turner in
noting that the obligations were claims “despite the fact that at the time of the plan’s confirmation they are not
yet ‘fixed’ or ‘matured’ and remain ‘contingent.’” Id. at 661 (quoting Turner, 101 B.R. at 751). Thus, Colon
also implicitly adopted the prepetition contract portion of Turner.
179 Id. at 663.
173
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the [d]ebtors for collection of [HOA] assessments and the stay should not be
modified to allow the same.”180
Colon could have been consistent with Foster if the court had first found
that the debt arose from a running covenant, and that by abandoning the
property, the debtors effectively ceased to hold the necessary interest to trigger
continued liability.181 However, this reading would have made Colon
incompatible with Spencer, which found a continued obligation in spite of
abandonment.182 In any event, the textualist reading in this case is the stronger
interpretation because of the convergence of the expressio unius canon and the
judicial preference not to render any statutory provisions superfluous or
meaningless.183 While generally “[t]here are reasons to be skeptical” of this
second canon,184 a purposivist reading of this particular statute renders not just
one term in a list unnecessary, but an entire provision. The most problematic
argument in Foster was the dismissal of Congress’s decision not to include
cases brought under § 1328(a) in the § 523(a) exceptions from discharge:
We recognize that the discharge provision under chapter 13 is
broader than that in chapter 7. However, we doubt the omission of
§ 1328(a) in § 523(a)(16) or vice versa evinces a legislative intent to
discharge postpetition HOA dues under § 1328(a) when the debtor
uses the cure and maintenance provisions under chapter 13 to stay in
his or her property after the order for relief . . . Whether the omission
of § 1328(a) in § 523(a)(16) or vice versa is a statutory misstep is a
question we need not answer. Suffice to say, on the facts before us,
there is no statutory default rule regarding an exception to discharge
185
for postpetition HOA dues.

In fact, the original amendment to the Code that introduced § 523(a)(16) was
intended to cure the lack of a default rule.186 Still, a court should not so easily
dismiss the omission of § 1328(a) from the amendment simply to allow it to
treat all cases identically, regardless of which section was used to effect
discharge. If Congress intended to prevent discharge of postpetition
assessments in all cases, it could have done so by including it in the

180

Id.
See supra notes 134–41 and accompanying text.
182 See supra notes 151–52 and accompanying text.
183 See MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 155, at 248.
184 Id.
185 Foster v. Double R Ranch Ass’n (In re Foster), 435 B.R. 650, 659 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2010).
186 See Liberty Cmty. Mgmt. v. Hall (In re Hall), 454 B.R. 230, 238 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2011) (explaining
Congress’s intent in creating § 523(a)(16)).
181
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enumerated sections to which § 523(a) applies. In fact, it could simply have
said that the § 523(a)(16) amendment applies to all sections of the Code. As
the Code is written, the canons of construction discussed should be used to
guide the understanding that the inapplicability of the Code to § 1328(a) was
not accidental, but required instead an intentionally different outcome than
cases to which the exception applied.
In light of the overall intent of Congress in passing the amendment,187 and
the fact that “the discharge provision under chapter 13 is broader than that in
chapter 7,”188 the decision by Congress not to include every possible
bankruptcy case should not be overlooked. It is odd that an amendment
explicitly seeking to expand the exceptions to discharge189 would omit from its
language such an important subset of bankruptcy cases, but that does not
enable courts to assume there was no reason for the omission.190
Even so, Foster and Spencer are not the only courts to reach such a
conclusion. An additional court, in Liberty Community Management, Inc. v.
Hall (In re Hall), addressed this argument explicitly and determined that “the
addition of [§] 523(a)(16) does not necessarily pre-suppose that [postpetition]
assessments are claims.”191 It continued: “There is no legislative history
indicating that [postpetition] assessments are ‘claims.’ It is just as likely that
Congress was implying that [postpetition] assessments are not really claims at
all, and that the amendment was necessary to correct the mischaracterization of
[postpetition] assessments as claims.”192 Finally, according to the court, the
stated purpose of adding § 523(a)(16) was to cure a split of authority as to
whether association fees were dischargeable.193
The court also asserted that Congress intended to increase protection to
HOAs: “Congress expressly intended to prevent such fees from being
discharged to the detriment of associations.”194 This argument seems to have
an answer to the expressio unius canon, but it nevertheless fails to explain why
Congress would use a § 523(a) exception to resolve confusion as to the
187 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 523.LH (Alan N. Resnick and Henry J. Sommer, eds., 16th ed. 2011)
(noting that aside from a technical exception, “every other 2005 amendment to [§] 523(a) was designed to
expand the scope of the subject discharge exception”).
188 Foster, 435 B.R. at 659.
189 4 COLLIER, supra note 187.
190 See Director v. Palmer Coking Coal Co., 867 F.2d 552, 556 (9th Cir. 1989).
191 Hall, 454 B.R. at 237.
192 Id. at 238.
193 Id.
194 Id.
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definition of a claim. The more likely conclusion is that Congress had a reason
not to take the strongest possible step toward excepting postpetition
assessments in absolutely all cases. Whether it was due to a congressional
misstep195 or came about as a result of a compromise in drafting the bill196 is of
little import; in either case, it is Congress’s job, and not the courts’, to ensure
that the law says what it was intended to say.
In light of these two canons of construction, it logically follows that only
either Colon or Foster can adhere to the plain reading of the statute, although
they both claim to do so. In fact, having decided that § 523(a)(16) did not
apply to their cases, they effectively reverted to the same precedent that
resulted in the amendment in the first place.197 Because it led to the equitable
conclusion that a homeowner continuing to reside at a property should
continue to pay, Foster relied on Rosenfeld.198 Colon, in turn, distinguished
Foster according to the type of interest the debtor held over the property,
implicitly following the In re Ryan line of reasoning.199 Colon also relied on
the Turner rule, which instructs that HOA dues are “claims” as meant by the
bankruptcy court.200 Further complicating Colon’s relationship to Foster, the
part of Turner quoted in Colon’s reasoning states that “‘federal bankruptcy
law, not state law, governs when a debt or claim arises for purposes of
determining whether or not a debt is discharged.’”201
When a § 1328(a) debtor has surrendered the property and a bank is
unwilling to complete foreclosure, the plain language of the Code actually
leads to the equitable conclusion that postpetition assessments are
dischargeable because they are claims that arose out of a prepetition agreement
and are not excepted by any other Code provisions.202 Cases that reach a
different conclusion do so because “the determination of property rights and
195

See Foster v. Double R Ranch Ass’n (In re Foster), 435 B.R. 650, 659 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2010).
See generally John F. Manning, Competing Presumptions About Statutory Coherence, 74 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2009, 2010 (2006) (“The design of the legislative process emphasizes the need for compromise, and
compromises are often complex, awkward, and even incoherent—thus making it dangerous for judges to
smooth over the details of an agreed-upon text to make it more coherent with its perceived purpose”).
197 See supra Part II.A.
198 Foster, 435 B.R. at 660 (“[T]he holding in Rosenfeld is persuasive”).
199 Ricotta, supra note 4, at 194. (“The Ryan line took a compromise position, which posited that
postpetition assessments were dischargeable unless the debtor resided in or leased the unit.”); see also In re
Ryan, 100 B.R. 411 (Bankr. N.D Ill.1989).
200 In re Colon, 465 B.R. 657, 661–62 (Bankr. D. Utah 2011) (citing In re Turner, 101 B.R. 751, 754
(Bankr. D. Utah 1989)).
201 Id. at 551 (citing Turner, 101 B.R. at 754).
202 Id. at 661–63.
196
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enforceable obligations is left to state law,” but even these cases acknowledge
this to be true only when the Code does not speak to the question.203 Turner
determined that the Code is instructive on this issue.204 This is among the
outcomes that should be made uniform in a subsequent amendment to the Code
because the Colon outcome is the truly equitable one. Still, despite the clear
windfall to a debtor under the Code if the Foster decision is an inaccurate
interpretation, the analysis in Colon is more appropriate, because it is
consistent with the plain language of the Code.205
C. Suggested Statutory Amendments to Resolve Inequities and Inconsistencies
As a stopgap, the Pigg, Foster, and Colon decisions reached equitable
conclusions, but they did so at the expense of the disciplined operation of their
judicial duties. Foster’s holding was at least supported by pre-amendment case
law206 and stayed in line with Congress’s overall intentions in passing the
amendment. However, Foster ignored the implied meaning of Congress’s
omission of § 1328(a) from cases affected by § 523(a)(16).207 Courts have
confounded the implied definition of a “claim” and disagreed on whether
federal or state law governs the timing and substance of claims. This
demonstrates how important it is for Congress to revisit the Code. A more
satisfactory draft would extend the exception to all § 1328 bankruptcy cases,208
but would also eliminate the necessity for decisions like Pigg by eliminating
inequitable statutory outcomes.209

203

Maple Forest Condo. Ass’n v. Spencer (In re Spencer), 457 B.R. 601, 609 (E.D. Mich. 2011).
Turner, 101 B.R. at 754 (“[F]ederal bankruptcy law, not state law, governs when a debt or claim arises
for purposes of determining whether or not a debt is discharged in a [c]hapter 7 case.”).
205 Colon, 465 B.R. at 661–63.
206 See River Place E. Hous. Corp. v. Rosenfeld (In re Rosenfeld), 23 F.3d 833, 838 (4th Cir. 1994)
(holding that when HOA fees are a product of a covenant running with the land, HOA fees are an incidence of
ownership and a prepetition contract, rendering the fees nondischargeable). It is important to note that the
amendment was in direct response to, but did not adopt precisely, the view of the Rosenfeld court. Thus,
although the amendment unquestionably does not apply to Foster, this should have been a consideration in
applying the Rosenfeld rule to a post-amendment chapter 13 case.
207 4 COLLIER, supra note 187, ¶ 523.LH[b][iv] (noting that aside from a technical exception, “every other
2005 amendment to [§] 523(a) was designed to expand the scope of the subject discharge exception”).
208 More, specifically, cases discharged under § 1328(a), such as Foster.
209 See Pigg v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P. (In re Pigg), 453 B.R. 728, 736 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn.
2011) (basing their decision on the idea that “equity demands that the court fashion a remedy that balances
rights of the lienholders and the right of a debtor to a fresh start”).
204
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1. Define “Legal, Equitable, or Possessory” Interest More Narrowly,
Thereby Relieving the Debtor of Liability Once the Bank Has Seized the
Property
One way to eliminate the inequities in such cases is to return to the pre2005 rule, at least for debtors whose homes have been seized by creditors, as in
Pigg. This would help the debtor achieve a fresh start and would protect the
creditor’s claims, but such a rule would come at the expense of the interests of
the HOA and would effectively enable application of the Colon solution to
chapter 7 cases. However, to cure the inequity to the debtor in this way,
Congress must to be willing to rescind some of the protection it provided,
explicitly and intentionally, through the amendments in the first place. Still,
this minor change would eliminate the uneasiness courts have repeatedly felt
regarding the imposition of postpetition assessments on debtors who have no
way of divesting themselves of the property.
A related alternative would be to actually shift the liability for such fees to
the creditor as of the date of bankruptcy petition, rather than as of foreclosure.
This would effectively define this postbankruptcy obligation as a risk of
lending, but because it would be limited to those circumstances where the
creditor has actually taken steps to reclaim the property, the institution of such
obligations would be entirely within the creditor’s control.
This alternative would solve the very narrow problem addressed by the
Pigg opinion, wherein the creditor took actual possession of the property, but
would not remedy the injustice suffered by debtors who have attempted to
vacate without the ability to force any action at all by a creditor. Thus, a
stronger alternative may still be necessary.
2. Legislatively Adopt the Pigg Remedy
The remedy constructed by Pigg is a fairly ingenious one, and if enacted by
statute, it would balance all the competing interests in a fair and thoughtful
way. Pigg essentially forced the sale of the property as would be done in a case
involving an unsecured or oversecured property, and distributed the proceeds
according to the priority established by the secured status of each creditor.210
Statutorily imposing on a creditor a choice between commencing foreclosure
or selling the property would enable the court to avoid extinguishing the

210

Id. at 735–36.
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creditor’s rights while ensuring the debtor’s fresh start.211 If the creditor prefers
to retain the property in hopes that its value will increase, as is suggested by
some courts as the impetus behind the trend towards slow or stalled foreclosure
actions in the wake of the housing market crisis, the creditor can take on the
obligations that go with sitting on those rights.212 If instead it chooses not to
take on the immediate cost of paying the assessments themselves, the Pigg
remedy would provide for such a creditor to be compensated while
simultaneously protecting the HOA and allowing the debtor a fresh start
without the burden of any recurring payments.
Even if courts are generally reluctant to transfer the obligation to an
unwilling creditor, an exception should be included for situations in which the
creditor has actually taken possession of the property at issue—as occurred in
Pigg—by considering the creditor to be, by definition, in full “legal”
possession for this single, limited purpose.
3. Convert Claims on Homes to “Use it or Lose it” Claims
A bankruptcy proceeding is not only focused on ensuring the debtor’s fresh
start, but also looks after the interests of creditors.213 However, the 2005
amendment focused too much on the burden imposed on HOAs and
purportedly solved that problem by placing the entire burden on the debtor,
ignoring the windfall obtained by the creditor and forcing courts to
significantly harm debtors’ fresh starts.214 Creditors should not be able to bide
their time and wait for the market to improve their investment while passing
off the costs of such investment to an unwilling debtor, as the Code currently
allows.215
If creditors want to enjoy the benefits of an improved market, they should
also bear the cost of not acting immediately.216 The windfall given to creditors
through this legislation is not mentioned in the case law, but should be
considered in the balancing of competing interests. Congress’s actions were
211

Id.
See Canning v. Beneficial Me., Inc. (In re Canning), 442 B.R. 165, 172 (Bankr. D. Me. 2011).
213 See Arsenault v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (In re Arsenault), 456 B.R. 627, 631 (Bankr. S.D. Ga.
2011) (“Debtors’ fresh start is not the only interest addressed in the [] Code.”).
214 See H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, at 88 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 154.
215 Canning, 442 B.R. at 172.
216 This passing off of costs was explicitly deemed acceptable in Canning when the court noted that part
of the decision whether to foreclose is based on expectations of the real estate market and the fact that real
estate may appreciate. Id. (“The Cannings’ demand [that the creditors] ‘foreclose or release, now’ ignores the
prospect that real estate values change.”).
212
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stated as being intended to support HOAs suffering from lack of funds as a
result of members’ bankruptcies,217 but bankruptcy as a whole is intended to
protect debtors.218 Indeed, bankruptcy as an institution reflects a policy
decision that emphasizes, at least in some cases, the debtor’s interests must
come before the creditors’.
That Congress has chosen to put HOAs in a specially protected class is not
for the courts to review, even if the choice was made under the influence of
special interest groups, as suggested with disapproval by Pigg.219 However,
Congress made no mention of general lenders in its reports,220 and it stands to
reason that one way to solve the inequity would be to pass additional
legislation explicitly leaving liability with the creditor in situations such as
those at issue in Pigg. Since a secured claim is supposed to be supported
entirely by the collateral, it could be argued that the costs of maintaining the
property are simply part of the initial lending contract. This would place the
burden on the party with the ability to control the timeline of the proceedings,
preventing debtors from being stuck in a “quagmire” while awaiting action by
the creditor.221
Such a development would undoubtedly lead to a change in the lending
market. The precise reaction on the part of creditors is beyond the scope of this
Comment, but would be worthy of further examination in the future. That said,
it can be assumed that costs for all borrowers would increase, in the form of
interest rates or other measures instituted by lenders to protect themselves.
Still, this is not necessarily an unfavorable outcome. For one thing, although
circumstances like that in Pigg, Colon, and Spencer have become more
frequent in recent years,222 there is no indication that the majority of creditors
refuse to foreclose. Thus, the actual change in cost is likely to be relatively
slight. In addition, it could represent a policy decision on par with vicarious
217

H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, at 88.
See Katherine Porter & Deborah Thorne, The Failure of Bankruptcy’s Fresh Start, 92 CORNELL L.
REV. 67, 68 (2006) (“The principal theory of consumer bankruptcy in America is that it provides a ‘fresh start’
for debtors.” (citing Margaret Howard, A Theory of Discharge in Consumer Bankruptcy, 48 OHIO ST. L.J.
1047, 1047, 1059 (1987))).
219 Pigg v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P. (In re Pigg), 453 B.R. 728, 735–36 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn.
2011). The suggestion that the influence of special interest groups in lawmaking can be used as support for
judicial action to overrule a facially unambiguous statutory provision is particularly troubling. By questioning
the system itself, this is perhaps the most egregious evidence of judicial overreach in this opinion.
220 See H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, at 88.
221 In re Colon, 465 B.R. 657, 663 (Bankr. D. Utah 2011).
222 Pigg, 453 B.R. at 733–34 (explaining how the economic landscape has changed in recent years due to
the collapse of the real estate market, and lenders are refusing to foreclose as a result of it).
218
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liability rules to shift the liability to creditors who are in the best position to
protect their investments through insurance or cost-spreading.223
4. Include § 1328(a) in the Types of Cases Within Which HOA Dues Are
Excepted for Postpetition Claims when the Debtor Retains the Property
Legislative intent to broaden protection for HOAs is hardly indecipherable,
as this section of the Code has been amended twice.224 The second of these
amendments was explicitly meant for the protection of associations and
community organizations.225 Thus, it seems odd that an amendment explicitly
seeking to expand the scope of the exceptions to discharge226 would itself
except from its language such an important class of bankruptcy cases. Many
courts have made this argument in reaching a conclusion that would be
consistent with a plain reading of the statute if § 523(a)(16) had been explicitly
adopted for § 1328(a) cases.227 But it ignores the fact that Congress had the
opportunity to act in this way and chose not to do so.
The appropriate congressional reaction to this particular ambiguity,
therefore, depends upon whether the omission of § 1328(a) from the
§ 523(a)(16) exception was a “statutory misstep,”228 or the result of a
legislative compromise.229 If Congress truly wanted the statute read so as to put
the interests of the HOA above all other related interests in a bankruptcy
proceeding, a new amendment should simply expand the coverage of
§ 523(a)(16) to also cover § 1328(a) discharges. This cures the Foster problem,
but would draw Colon back within the plain language and cause an inequitable
problem similar to that faced by the court in Pigg. Therefore this solution,
while certainly the simplest, must be accompanied by one of the solutions to
223 See First Nat. Bank of Louisville v. Lustig, 727 F. Supp. 276, 280 (E.D. La. 1989) (“The modern
economic and legal rationale for [respondeat superior] is that an employer is in a better position to internalize
and absorb the costs of the liabilities incurred by his employees as a cost of doing business; or to insure against
such liabilities, and to shift these costs to the public.”).
224 Ariane Holtschlag, Assessing § 523(a)(16), AM. BANKR. INST. J., June 2012, at 17 (noting that the
second amendment adding the “legal, equitable or possessory” clause is an “odd reversal of course for
Congress”).
225 H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, at 88.
226 4 COLLIER, supra note 187, ¶ 523.LH[b][iv].
227 See Foster v. Double R Ranch Ass’n (In re Foster), 435 B.R. 650, 659 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2010)
(doubting that there is legislative intent behind the “omission of § 1328(a) in § 523(a)(16) or vice versa”);
Maple Forest Condo. Ass’n v. Spencer (In re Spencer), 457 B.R. 601 (E.D. Mich. 2011) (noting that courts
adopt a narrow version of § 523(a)(16) when deciding cases that fall outside the statutory language according
to one of three lines of cases developed before the enactment of § 523(a)(16)).
228 Foster, 435 B.R. at 659.
229 MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 155, at 224.
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the larger inequity listed above, unless Congress is truly comfortable with
placing such a large burden on bankrupt homeowners.
CONCLUSION
In summary, the Code leaves a court with an instruction that leads to unfair
results in three of the six possible types of discharge to which it applies. While
it is intuitive that a debtor should continue to pay assessments while in
possession of the property, this actually only seems to occur, absent creative
argument on the parts of the courts deciding the cases, in §§ 727 and 1328(b)
cases. In a § 1328(a) case, the plain language pushes away from the exception
that should be applied, giving the homeowner the benefit of both a discharge
and continued enjoyment of the HOA’s services. By contrast, when the debtor
surrenders the property, only when discharge is granted under § 1328(a) does
the intuitive result follow from the statute and grant discharge of HOA fees;
under both §§ 727 and 1328(b) a debtor could theoretically be left paying
unending fees on a property on behalf of a creditor that refuses to foreclose.
The table below, reprinted from the Introduction and updated with the case
names that correspond to each scenario, summarizes these outcomes.230 As the
table shows, courts have had to accept unjust outcomes or argue around the
Code in half of the scenarios; when a statute so often fails to conform to an
intuitive view of justice, it seems logical that the statute must be revisited.

§ 727 – Intuitive Result
Actual Result
§ 1328(a) – Intuitive Result
Actual Result
§ 1328(b) – Intuitive Result
Actual Result

Property Retained
No discharge
No discharge – √
No discharge
Discharge – X –
Foster
No discharge
No discharge - √

Property Surrendered
Discharge
No discharge – X – Pigg
Discharge
Discharge – √ –
Spencer/Colon
Discharge
No discharge - X

The court in Pigg reached what seems clearly to be a more equitable
conclusion than the statute’s plain language would allow. It did so, however,
via an impermissible act of judicial activism when it could have focused on the
most important fact distinguishing it from nearly all other cases in this area: the

230 For each section, the shaded box represents what seems to be the fair outcome and the one sought by
courts in the cases discussed throughout this Comment. On the other hand, the bottom row corresponds to the
result of interpreting the plain language.
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creditor was in control of the property.231 While this would still have
contradicted the plain language, it would have done so in a way that more
definitely explained why the legislature was unlikely to have considered the
scenario at issue in this case and kept the court within the boundaries of its
traditional role in the political realm.
In Foster as well, the court was forced to go out of its way to work around,
rather than through, the statutory language to reach what should be an obvious
result. This is starkly shown by the Colon opinion, which interpreted the plain
language differently and more strictly. The two are irreconcilable because there
is no principled way to differentiate between a homeowner who has only legal
title to a property and one who still retains actual possession in light of
Congress’s enactment of § 523(a)(16), which implicitly defined HOA fees as
claims in bankruptcy. The omission of § 1328(a) from § 523(a) cannot be so
easily ignored. Postpetition dues are excepted from discharge, and the court’s
usual preference not to make statutory language superfluous requires that they
therefore be considered otherwise dischargeable claims. Foster found
otherwise only because it was necessary to prevent the debtor, who was living
in a home and benefiting from HOA membership, from discharging his
obligation to pay the HOA fees.
Colon stayed within a textualist reading of the Code, but was also forced to
try reconciling the irreconcilable; its holding is simply not one that can be
compatible simultaneously with both Foster and Spencer. In fact, Spencer had
the opportunity to reach the same fair conclusion found in Colon, but
confusion over the legislative definition of claim led instead to its following
Foster, furthering the unjust situation the court in Pigg worked so hard to
overcome.
Thus, it is necessary to revisit the statute a third time to protect HOAs and
debtors from bearing the risks accepted by creditors at the time loans are
distributed while simultaneously ensuring that a plain reading does not
promote a windfall for the chapter 13 debtor. It is possible that even the
outcome in Pigg was contemplated by Congress in the passage of the 2005
amendment. If so, Congress should simply act to overrule the judicial action in
that case. Otherwise, one or more of the changes suggested above would
operate to retain, as much as possible, the balance struck by those amendments

231

Pigg v. BAC Home Loans Servicing (In re Pigg), 453 B.R. 728, 731, 733 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2011).
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while at the same time protecting the chapter 7 debtor who has vacated and
surrendered her property.
Such an amendment should also explain the legislative intent in omitting
§ 1328(a) from the list of discharges from which postpetition assessments are
excepted. If indeed this was an intentional move by Congress, then an
amended statute could add to the legislative history, ideally with an
explanation for why there should be a difference between a § 1328(a)
discharge and a consumer discharge under any other chapter. If it was merely
an accidental oversight, the amendment would solve this too, by extending the
application of § 523(a)(16) either with a general provision within § 523(a) or
by adding that section to the list of exceptions contained within § 1328(a)(2).
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